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On the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon

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In 10 Diels mentions a v.l. *τιν'*, which may, I think, be right. But the construction of the words *ὄψιν ἔχων πίστει* is very obscure. Nor can I see how it can find a parallel in the Homeric *σῆσιν ἔχε φρεσί*. Possibly the cases have become inverted *μήτε τιν' ὄψει ἔχων πίστιν πλέον*. If this is so, the accus. *ἀκοήν* in 11 is constructed *κατὰ σύνεσιν* 'not trusting your sight more than if you had heard, or accepting the ears' sounding message beyond the clear indications of the tongue.'

Emped. fr. 17. 20, 21, 25

καὶ Φιλότης ἐν τοῖσιν, ἴση μῆκός τε πλάτος τε·
τὴν σὺ νόφ δέρκευ, μηδ' ὄμμασιν ἥσο τεθιγώς·
τὴν οὐ τις ἴμετ' ὄσσοισιν ἐλίσσομένην δεδάκε
θνητὸς ἀνὴρ.

ὄσσοισιν 'with the eyes' appears indubitably

right: is not *μετ'* simply an expansion of *τ'* trajected from its proper place after *τὴν*?

Emp. fr. 64

τῷ δ' ἐπὶ καὶ Πόθος εἰσι δι' ὄψιος ἄμματα
μίσγων.

So Diels partly after Karsten and Wytténbach: but, unless I am much mistaken, the last words as given by the MSS. of Plutarch *διὰ πέψεως ἀμμίσγων* point rather to δι' ἄψιος αἰμ' ἀναμίσγων.

Timon fr. 62

ἐνθεν καὶ ὁ Τίμων αἰτιᾶται τὸν Πλάτωνα ἐπὶ τῷ
οὕτω καλλωπίζειν τὸν Σωκράτην πολλοῖς μαθή-
μασιν. ἡ γὰρ, φησι, τὸν οὐκ ἐθέλοντα ἱμεῖναι
ἡβολόγον.

μαίνευσι οὐ μίνας.

ROBINSON ELLIS.

ON THE MEMORABILIA OF XENOPHON.

1. 3. 14 οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἀφροδισιάζειν τοὺς μὴ
ἀσφαλῶς ἔχοντας πρὸς ἀφροδίσια φέτο χρήναι
πρὸς τοιαῦτα, οἷα μὴ πάνν μὲν δεομένου τοῦ
σώματος οὐκ ἂν προσδέξαιτο ἡ ψυχὴ, δεομένου δὲ
οὐκ ἂν πράγματα παρέχοι. Editors and critics
point out the unusual construction ἀφροδι-
σιάζειν πρὸς τι and also the very strange
use of the neuter τοιαῦτα οἷα, which is not
to be justified by thoughts of παιδικά. None
of them that I know of has suggested that
both difficulties disappear together, if we
take the second πρὸς as an accidental repe-
tion of the first, like ἐπὶ in 2. 1. 23 below,
and write ἀφροδισιάζειν...χρήναι τοιαῦτα οἷα
κ.τ.λ.

1. 6. 13 Ὡς ἂντιφῶν, παρ' ἡμῖν νομίζεται τὴν
ᾧραν καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμοίως μὲν καλόν, ὁμοίως
δὲ αἰσχρὸν διατίθεσθαι εἶναι. τὴν τε γὰρ ᾧραν
ἐὰν μὲν κ.τ.λ.· ἐὰν δὲ κ.τ.λ. καὶ τὴν σοφίαν
ὡσαύτως τοὺς μὲν...πωλοῦντας κ.τ.λ.· ὅστις δὲ
κ.τ.λ.

The point is not that it is equally
creditable and discreditable to dispose of the
two things, but that in both cases there is a
creditable as well as a discreditable way of
doing it, two possibilities with regard to
each of them, set forth with correspondence
of μέν and δέ. It follows that in the early
part of the sentence we want adverbs, not
adjectives: ὁμοίως μὲν καλῶς, ὁμοίως δὲ
αἰσχρῶς διατίθεσθαι εἶναι, εἶναι meaning it is

possible. For the double adverb cf. Thuc.
2. 60. 6 οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως τι οἰκείως φράζοι.

2. 1. 23 ὁρῶ σε, ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ἀποροῦντα ποίαν
ὁδὸν ἐπὶ τὸν βίον τράπη· ἐὰν οὖν ἐμὲ φίλην
ποιησάμενος, [ἐπὶ] τὴν ἡδίστην τε καὶ ῥάστην
ὁδὸν ἄξω σε.

The MSS. (including Stobaeus who has
ποιησάμενος) are divided between ποιησάμενος,
ποιήσῃ, ποιήσῃς, and ποιήσῃ, of which the
last three are much more likely to be
'corrections' of the first than the first to be
a corruption of them. Is then ποιησάμενος
right? The understanding over again of
ἐπὶ τὸν βίον τράπη is so awkward that I
think not. It is more probable that some
word like *βαδίτης* has dropped out. If so,
it is very tempting to insert a word almost
identical with the first syllables of ποιησά-
μενος and hence easily lost, reading ἐὰν οὖν
ἐμὲ φίλην <προίτης> ποιησάμενος.

ib. 26 οἱ μὲν ἐμοὶ φίλοι καλοῦσί με Εὐδαι-
μονίαν, οἱ δὲ μισοῦντές με ὑποκοριζόμενοι ὀνο-
μάζουσι Κακίαν.

It is certain that ὑποκοριζόμενοι cannot be
used of calling by a bad name, as it means
just the opposite. There is therefore a good
deal of plausibility in the proposal to put
the word into the first clause instead of the
second; only then, as Gilbert says, *Vice
videtur tanquam suam causam prodere*. Was

it not a gloss written in the margin and intended to apply to the first clause (φίλοι κ.τ.λ.), then inserted by mistake in the text and inserted in the wrong place?

2. 2. 9 ὅταν ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις ἀλλήλους τὰ ἔσχατα λέγουσιν.

Ἐσχατα πάσχειν, ἔσχατα κακά, etc. are recognised phrases; but ἔσχατα λέγειν seems questionable. Does it occur elsewhere? I should be inclined to read αἰσχιστα. The words are sometimes confused, and Soph. *Aj.* 1320, 1324: *Phil.* 607 with *Iliad* 3. 38: 6. 325 are enough to establish the propriety of αἰσχιστα here.

2. 6. 5 ὅστις . . ἐγκρατὴς μὲν ἐστί τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἡδονῶν, εὖοικος δὲ καὶ εὐσύμβολος ὃν τυγχάνει καὶ φιλόνομος πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἐλλείπεσθαι εὖ ποιῶν τοὺς εὐεργετοῦντας αὐτόν.

Of the two best MSS. one has εὖοικος, the other εἰνους. The rest are divided between εἰνους, εὖοικος, and εὐορκος. Εὖοικος is unmeaning here, and neither εἰνους nor εὐορκος accounts for the various readings. Εἰνοικός, which I suspect Xenophon wrote, will account fairly for all three, εὐορκος being an easy 'correction' of εὖοικος after the ν was lost. He has the adverb εἰνοικῶς about a dozen times, though the adjective, which is less common generally, seems not to occur in his writings. Εἰνοικός is a more proper word than εἰνους here; a man is εἰνοικός by nature, εἰνους by accident of acquaintance, etc.

ib. 38 εἰ σοὶ πείσασμαι κοινῇ τὴν πόλιν ψευδόμενος, ὥς ἂν στρατηγικῶς τε καὶ δικαστικῶς καὶ πολιτικῶς, ἐαυτὴν ἐπιτρέψαι.

The distinction in this sort of use between ὥς and ὥς ἂν (cf. Kühner's note) is not very hard to grasp. Ἐπιτρέπω σοὶ ἐμάντον ὥς σοφῶς means that I regard you as wise and put myself in your hands accordingly; ἐπιτρέπω σοὶ ἐμάντον ὥς ἂν σοφῶς means that I do not, at least necessarily, regard you as wise, but that for some reason or other I put myself in your hands as though you were: 'I entrust myself to you, as I should to a wise man, or as I should if I thought you wise.' So τοῦτο ποιεῖ, ὥς σοφὸς ὢν, 'as a wise man, he acts in this way'; τοῦτο ποιεῖ ὥς ἂν σοφός, 'he acts in this way, as a wise man would do,' by no means assuming that he is wise, though possibly his wisdom might be inferred from his action. In other words ὥς ἂν cannot be used to introduce a fact or what is regarded as a fact by the person or persons immediately concerned. In late Greek this distinction is lost and ὥς ἂν used freely for ὥς, but in good Attic it is always maintained.

It would seem therefore doubtful whether the expression ascribed to Solon about the Athenians driven abroad,

γλώσσαν οὐκέτ' Ἀττικὴν
ιέντας, ὥς ἂν πολλαχῇ πλανωμένους,

can be quite rightly preserved, for they *did* wander in many places, whereas ὥς ἂν means *as though* they wandered. In spite of Gilbert I do not think it can be said that ὥς ἂν is inappropriate here in Xenophon, as it is distinctly meant that Critobulus lacks the qualifications in question. Athens might be induced to trust herself to him *as she would* to a competent man. At the same time the hypothesis is that she thinks him competent, and for that ὥς is more proper, like ὥς ὄντι οικονομικῶς τε καὶ ἐπιμελεῖ in the next and precisely parallel sentence. *An here has been changed to ὄντι (Weiske), but that is very improbable. Remembering however the very frequent interchange of ἂν and δῆ, I think it is an open question whether here and in 3. 6. 4: 3. 8. 1 δῆ should not be read. Certainly here and in 3. 6. 4 it would be quite in place: in 3. 8. 1 less so.

2. 9. 4 οὐ γὰρ ἦν οἷος ἀπὸ παντὸς κερδαίνειν ἀλλὰ φιλόχρηστός τε καὶ ἔφη ῥᾶστον εἶναι ἀπὸ τῶν συκοφαντῶν λαμβάνειν.

Archdemus is an able and honourable man who sees no objection to making the συκοφάνται yield up some of their ill-gotten gains. In the present case he gave one of them no peace ἕως τὸν τε Κρίτωνα ἀφῆκε καὶ αὐτῷ χρήματα ἔδωκε. But it is inept to say of him that he was honourable and thought it very *easy* to get money out of the συκοφάνται. The two things do not hang together. It occurred to me first that ῥᾶστον might be a mistake for χρηστοῦ, 'that it was quite the part of an honourable man,' as Euripides says (*Fragm.* 678 Nauck) ἔστι τοι καλὸν κακοὺς κολάζειν. But perhaps the more familiar interchange of ῥᾶστος and ἀριστος affords a better explanation. He used to say ἀριστον εἶναι, that it was the best thing or a very good thing to do.

There is much awkwardness about τε καὶ coupling an adjective and a verb. Perhaps Xenophon wrote something like φιλόχρηστός τε καὶ <φιλόκαλος καὶ> ἔφη.

3. 3. 7 θῆγειν δὲ τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν ἱππέων καὶ ἐξοργίζειν πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους, ἅπερ ἀλκιμωτέρους ποιεῖ, διανενόησαι;

As some, though not the best, MSS. have εἴπερ and all MSS. are said to have ποιεῖν (ποιεῖ Stobaeus), it may be worth considering whether Xenophon wrote εἴπερ ἀλκιμωτέρους

ποιεῖν <βούλει>. Cf. 3. 6. 3 εἴπερ τιμᾶσθαι βούλει, ὠφελιγέα σοι ἢ πόλις ἐστὶ.

3. 5. 1 Καὶ ὁ Περικλῆς, βουλομένην ἄν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἃ λέγεις· ὅπως δὲ ταῦτα γένοιτ' ἄν, οὐ δύναμαι γνῶναι. Βούλει οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, διαλογιζόμενοι περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπισκοπῶμεν ὅπου ἦδη τὸ δυνατόν ἐστι;

I think the editors ought to have seen before now that δυνατόν is a mistake, made in many other places too, for ἀδύνατον. Consider the context. Young Pericles would like to improve the military strength and reputation of Athens, but he is afraid it can't be done. Well, says Socrates, shall we try and find out where the difficulty, the impossibility, lies? The Athenians are as numerous as the Boeotians; they are physically as robust, morally as patriotic and public-spirited; they have at least as glorious a history to inspire them. Ah, but for some time past (says Pericles) Boeotia has been gaining courage and Athens losing it. That (Socrates rejoins) will make the Athenians all the more ready to follow anyone who shows them how to retrieve their credit and position. Socrates thus shows, point by point, that there is *nothing* to prevent Pericles from effecting what he wishes. The argument would have to take another turn altogether, if they set out to consider how the thing was possible. 'How are you to do it? They are numerous, robust,' etc.: that is nonsense. 'Why should you not do it? Where is the impossibility? They are numerous, robust,' etc.: this is sense.

Notice also the concluding words of the dialogue (28): ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἂν τούτων καταπράξῃς . . . καλὸν ἔσται . . . , ἐὰν δέ τι αὐτῶν ἀδύνατον ᾖ, κ.τ.λ.

ιβ. 7 ἀλλὰ μὲν, ἔφη ὁ Περικλῆς, εἴ γε νῦν, μάλιστα πείθονται, ὥρα ἂν εἰπὴν λέγειν, πῶς ἂν αὐτοὺς προτρεψαίμεθα κ.τ.λ.

Continuing the discussion, Pericles says, 'If what you say is true, that under present circumstances they would be more ready to follow a leader, then we might go on to ask how best to animate them with a right ambition.' It is abundantly clear that this requires not εἴ γε νῦν μάλιστα πείθονται, 'if they were now to listen' but εἴ γε νῦν μάλιστ' ἂν πείθονται, 'if it is true that they would now be likely to listen.' So in 4. 3. 8 μάλισθ' ἡμᾶς ὠφελούη is now always corrected to μάλιστ' ἂν ἡμᾶς, and the error is an extremely common one.

ιβ. 9 They must remind the Athenians how their ancestors won such eminence: εἰ

τούς γε παλαιάτους ὧν ἀκούομεν προγόνους αὐτῶν ἀναμνησκόμεν αὐτοὺς ἀκηκοτάς ἀρίστους γεγονέναι.

No one appears to have made sense of ἀκηκοτάς, and it is often omitted. Even Cobet sanctions this. The course of the argument however seems to show that ἀκηκοτάς is a blunder for ἀσκούντας. They got their place by hard training. Cf. 14 εἰ μὲν ἐξευρόντες τὰ τῶν προγόνων ἐπιτηδεύματα μηδὲν χεῖρον ἐκείνων ἐπιτηδεύοιεν, and 15 σωμασκήσουσιν. In Dion. Hal. 450 τοῖς ἀσκούσι τὴν πολιτικὴν φιλοσοφίαν is now read after Reiske's conjecture for τοῖς ἀκούουσι τ.π.φ. Thuc. 2. 39. 2 ἐπιτόνῳ ἀσκήσει εὐθὺς νέοι ὄντες τὸ ἀνδρεῖον μετέρχονται illustrates the meaning, though he and Xenophon seem to differ about the fact.

3. 11. 14 Πῶς οὖν ἂν, ἔφη (Theodote the courtesan), ἐγὼ λιμὸν ἐμποιῖν τῶν παρ' ἐμοὶ δυναίμην; Εἰ νῆ Δέ', ἔφη, πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς κεκορεσμένοις μήτε προσφέροις μήτε ὑπομνήσκεις, ἕως ἂν τῆς πλησμονῆς παυσάμενοι πάλιν δέωνται, ἔπειτα τοὺς δεομένους ὑπομνήσκεις ὡς κοσμιωτάτῃ τε ὁμιλίᾳ καὶ τῷ <μῇ Cobet, Schenkl, Gilbert, Marchant> φαίνεσθαι βουλομένη χαρίζεσθαι καὶ διαφεύγουσα ἕως ἂν ὡς μάλιστα δεηθῶσι.

It is odd that Cobet should have inserted μῇ in the wrong place: still odder that all the editors have followed him so obediently. His extraordinary insight might well by some accident go for once astray, but how is it none of the editors have seen that the necessary μῇ must precede not φαίνεσθαι but either βουλομένη or χαρίζεσθαι? If it precedes φαίνεσθαι, then διαφεύγουσα is negatived too, 'not to appear anxious to avoid,' which makes nonsense. In strict logic and by ordinary idiom it should be βουλομένη μῇ χαρίζεσθαι. But it is also good Greek to write μῇ βουλομένη χαρίζεσθαι, in which case οὐ βούλομαι (cf. οὐ φημι, οὐ προσποιῶμαι, etc.) is like our 'I don't wish to gratify' = 'I wish not to gratify.' I should prefer however to write βουλομένη μῇ χαρίζεσθαι because the last syllable of βουλομένη will explain the loss of μῇ. Cf. on 4. 1. 3 below.

But the sentence contains another and less obvious mistake, not difficult to set right. The second ὑπομνήσκεις is quite inappropriate. If Theodote bears herself modestly and seems coy and reluctant, how can this be said to 'remind' men? The point should be and evidently is that it stimulates them, as going without food provokes hunger (13). The word for this, which ὑπομνήσκεις has displaced the more easily because the two words are partly

alike, is ὑποκνίζους. Socrates has already used it in this chapter (3) in the same sort of connection, ἀπιμεν ὑποκνιζόμενοι καὶ ἀπελθόντες ποθήσομεν. The first ὑποκνιζόμενοι here in 14, which seems appropriate enough, and which I do not wish to alter, remained in the copyist's mind and led him, no doubt unconsciously, to adapt ὑποκνίζους to it.

[Dr. Postgate points out to me the parallel afforded by Prop. 4. 5. 29, if we adopt the conjecture *exstimulare* or *et stimulare*. The right reading is however very doubtful.]

4. 1. 3 Socrates draws an illustration from dogs, pointing out τῶν κυνῶν τῶν εὐφρεστάτων... τὰς μὲν καλῶς ἀχθείας ἀρίστας γίγνεσθαι πρὸς τὰς θήρας καὶ χρησιμώτατας, ἀναγωγὸς δὲ γιγνομένης ματαίους τε καὶ μανιώδεις καὶ δυσπείθεστας. Read <τὰς> ἀναγωγὸς δέ, which seems especially needed after the partitive genitive τῶν-εὐφρεστάτων, and note that τὰς has been absorbed by the last syllable of χρησιμώτατας. For the position of δέ cf. 4. 5. 11 τὰ μὲν κράτιστα... τὰ ἥδιστα δὲ κ.τ.λ.

4. 2. 3 Παρασκευάσασθαι should be παρεσκευάσθαι, as in 4. 1. 5. The aorist tense is unsuitable, and the mistake one of a very common type.

4. 2. 10 γνωμονικοῦ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς καὶ τοῦτο δεῖ.

Strange constructions have been found for τοῦτο, and κὰν τοῦτῳ has been suggested. If Cobet is right in saying (*V.L.* pp. 155, 272) that καὶ and πρὸς get interchanged, we might very well read πρὸς τοῦτο. Note however a similar καὶ just before in καὶ ἱατρῶν.

ib. 28 ἐπιθυμοῦσι τούτους ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν βουλεύεσθαι, καὶ προῖστασθαι τε αὐτῶν τούτους, καὶ τὰς ἐλπίδας τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐν τούτοις ἔχουσι. τε is usually altered to γε after Stephanus. The construction is so awkward, especially with τούτους repeated, that some scholars have seemed to look with favour on his proposal to insert ἐθέλουσι (βούλονται?). But what has happened is that the infinitive βουλεύεσθαι has caused a finite verb to get into the infinitive too, quite a common sort of error. Xenophon wrote καὶ προῖστανται τε... καὶ... ἔχουσι. With that τούτους is right enough.

4. 4. 17 τίς δ' ἂν τις μᾶλλον πιστεύσειε παρακαταθέσθαι ἢ χρήματα ἢ υἱός;... τίς δ' ἂν μᾶλλον πολέμιοι πιστεύσειαν ἢ ἀνοχὰς ἢ σπονδὰς ἢ συνθήκας περὶ εἰρήνης;... τῷ δ' ἂν μᾶλλον
NO. CXLII. VOL. XVI.

οἱ σύμμαχοι πιστεύσειαν ἢ ἡγεμονίαν ἢ φρουράν ἢ πόλεις;

In the first sentence παρακαταθέσθαι is explanatory or consecutive, 'whom would a man sooner trust, so as to deposit?': in the the third πιστεύσειαν ἡγεμονίαν κ.τ.λ. is quite natural, 'commit these things to his hands. But in the second can you speak of enemies 'trusting' treaties, etc. to a man in the sense of making them with him in full trust and confidence as to his honour? The phrase can hardly be justified and perhaps an infinitive similar in construction to παρακαταθέσθαι has fallen out, e.g. πιστεύσειαν <ποιεῖσθαι> ἢ ἀνοχὰς.

4. 5. 1 αὐτὸς φανερός ἦν τοῖς συνοῦσιν ἡσκηκὼς αὐτὸν μάλιστα πάντων ἀνθρώπων. ἀσκῶ has two constructions: ἀσκῶ τινα *I practise (train) a man*: and ἀσκῶ τι *I practise a thing*, i.e. *practise myself in a thing*. ἀσκῶ τινα logically justifies ἀσκῶ ἐμαυτόν, but then this means exactly the same as ἀσκῶ τι, which is certainly the common expression. The only passage I find cited for the reflexive pronoun is *Cyrop.* 8. 6. 10 ἐξάγειν δ' ἐπὶ τὴν θήραν τὸν σατράπην τοὺς ἀπὸ θυρῶν καὶ ἀσκεῖν αὐτόν τε καὶ τοὺς σὺν ἑαυτῷ τὰ πολεμικά; but there it is by no means necessary. αὐτόν as subject of ἀσκεῖν makes perfectly good sense. Unless therefore other examples are forthcoming, I suspect that αὐτόν in the *Memorabilia* should be αὐτήν, i.e. ἐγκράτεια in the preceding sentence; and this is otherwise better than αὐτόν, as ἡσκηκὼς αὐτόν fails to specify what he trained himself in.

4. 6. 12 ὅπου μὲν ἐκ τῶν τὰ νόμιμα ἐπιτελοῦντων αἱ ἀρχαὶ καθίστανται, ταύτην μὲν τὴν πολιτείαν ἀριστοκρατίαν ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι.

Is not some word like ἀρίστα or μάλιστα needed with ἐπιτελοῦντων? Cf. *Cyrop.* 8. 1. 8 ὅταν μὲν ὁ ἐπιστάτης βελτίων γένηται, καθάρωτερον τὰ νόμιμα πράττεται ὅταν δὲ χείρων, φαυλότερον.

4. 7. 2 ἕως ἱκανὸς τις γένοιτο, εἴ ποτε δέησει, γῆν μέτρῳ ὀρθῶς ἢ παραλαβεῖν ἢ παραδοῦναι ἢ διανεῖμαι ἢ ἔργον ἀποδείξασθαι.

Here again something seems missing. The vague ἔργον ἀποδείξασθαι can hardly stand beside the other specific expressions. Read something like ἢ ἄλλο τι ἔργον (or ἢ ἔργον διοῦν), ἀποδείξασθαι.

ib. 4 ἐκέλευε δὲ καὶ ἀστρολογίας ἐμπείρους γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ταύτης μέντοι μέχρι τοῦ νυκτός τε ὥραν καὶ μηνὸς καὶ ἐνιαυτοῦ δύνασθαι γινώσκειν ἕνεκα πορείας τε καὶ πλοῦ καὶ φυλακῆς, καὶ, ὅσα ἄλλα ἡ νυκτός ἢ μηνὸς ἢ ἐνιαυτοῦ πράττεται, πρὸς ταῦτ' ἔχειν τεκμηρίους χρῆσθαι, τὰς ὥρας τῶν εἰρημένων διαγιγνώσκοντας.

There is sense in talking about a thing being done *νυκτός* *by night*, literally at *some time within a night*, but there is none in talking of a thing being done *μηνός* or *ἐνιαυτοῦ*, except when those genitives mean what they clearly do not mean here, *within a month or year*, that is at some time not more than a month or year distant, or in some given month (4. 8. 2) or year. It is plain that the sense here intended is things that have to be done at given times of the night, the month, or the year, or something like that. But no effort will get this sense out of the simple genitives *μηνός* and *ἐνιαυτοῦ*. The insertion of *ταῖς ὥραις* has been thought of, but it is not, I think, quite what is wanted, besides being open to the objection that we already have *ὥραν* and *τὰς ὥρας* in other parts of the sentence. I should say that some expression like 'by observation of night, month, year' is what Xenophon wrote, e.g. *ἐνιαυτοῦ <τηρήσει>*, or, to repeat a word used in § 2 about geometry, *ἐνιαυτοῦ <μετρήσει>*.

4. 7. 10 *εἴ τις μᾶλλον ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην σοφίαν ὠφελείσθαι βούλοιο, συνεβούλευε μαντικῆς ἐπιμελείσθαι*.

Is *μᾶλλον ὠφελείσθαι* a good Greek expression? *ὠφελείν* is one of the class of verbs noted by Cobet *N.L.* 270, with which are coupled not adverbs but neuter adjectives. The phrases are *πλέον, πλείστα, μεγάλα, μέγιστα, μηδέν, τοσοῦτον, ὠφελείν*, as any one may see, for instance, by examining *ὠφελῶ* in Ast's *Lexicon Platonicum*. That lexicon does indeed give one passage with *μάλιστα*, but there *μάλιστα* goes in sense with *ἐμοῦ*, not with the verb (*Theages* 127 D *εἰπερ οἶε ὑπ' ἐμοῦ μάλιστα ἂν σοι τοῦτον ὠφελήθῃναι*). Without therefore pronouncing *μᾶλλον* impossible (especially in Xenophon) we are justified in doubting it, and all the more if there is an obvious and easy remedy at hand. Probably Xenophon wrote *μᾶσσον*, a word which is now read for *ἐλάσσων* in *Cyrop.* 2. 4. 27 on the authority of Suidas and, again for *ἐλάσσων*, by conjecture in *Resp. Lac.* 12. 5. The superlative *μῆκιστος* also occurs in him two or three times. Semi-poetical as it is, it is just such a term as Xenophon rather likes using and just such as to get corrupted to a more familiar word, like *μᾶλλον* or *ἐλαττον*, as in the above instances. In the present context it seems especially suitable to the notion belonging to *μαντική* of something which sees and reaches *further* than ordinary human wisdom. A similar word which occurs several times in the *Memorabilia* is *μείων*, used instead of the familiar *ἥττων*.

4. 8. 7 *οὐδὲ διὰ τὸ φιλεῖν ἐμέ . . . ἀλλὰ διόπερ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἂν οἴονται ἐμοὶ συνόντες βέλτιστοι γίγνεσθαι*.

The editors seem not to notice this very curious use of *διόπερ*, in the sense of *because*. It may of course be a mistake for *διότι*, but it would be unsafe to alter it. Is there any other example of the use? Dem. 3. 19 has been taken so, but quite needlessly. Liddell and Scott mention that *διό* is similarly used in late Greek, quoting [Aristotle] *De Plant.* 2. 4. 825 b 19. That would be easier to alter.

There are two or three topics connected with the *Memorabilia* on which I will add a word.

(1) It is surprising that the *Oeconomicus* and *Symposium* have ever been thought to be detached portions of the *Memorabilia*, a view as old as Galen. Their length is in itself sufficient to disprove the idea, for *Symp.* is a quarter and *Oecon.* about half the total length of *Mem.*, the latter work containing only short or comparatively short conversations. Their contents also unfit them to be parts of it. *Mem.* is serious all through, either defending Socrates from charges brought against him or otherwise showing how good and improving his conversation was. *Symp.* is the account of a drinking-party, introducing Socrates in his lighter moments, characteristic enough, but no part of the earnest *Mem.* Moreover in *Symp.* Socrates is only one talker of many, the most prominent no doubt, but not holding the exclusive position which he does in *Mem.* Just as in Plato's like-named dialogue Agathon, Aristophanes and the rest all have their turn, so in Xenophon. *Oecon.* of course is serious enough, but in it again Socrates is by no means predominant throughout. For two-thirds of it Ischomachus is really the protagonist. Socrates does not become a mute person as in *Sophistes* and *Politicus*, but Ischomachus does most of the talking and sometimes talks continuously for a page or pages together. There is nothing like this in *Mem.*, and it would be inconsistent with the plan of the work. The somewhat clumsy structure of *Oecon.* is indeed noticeable. Xenophon narrates a long conversation between Socrates and Critobulus. A large part of this conversation consists of a narration by Socrates of another conversation he held with Ischomachus; and of this doubly narrated conversation with Ischomachus Ischomachus' narration of a third conversation forms no small part. Plato goes a long way in

the matter of narrated dialogue, but not so far as this. Also, awkwardly enough, *Oecon.* ends at the close of Socrates' conversation with Ischomachus, and without coming back to the talk with Critobulus in the course of which that conversation was narrated.

(2) I have not studied *Mem.* minutely enough to speak with absolute confidence, but the impression left on me by two or three fairly careful readings is that the bulk of it is genuine Xenophon, and that no good case is made out for the theory of incessant and extensive interpolations. We must allow for the fact that Xenophon is only a writer of moderate merit, and that his strength never lies in clear and forcible thinking; and we may assume, what is partly the same thing, that the work was never intended to be other than loose in its structure, and that very probably bits of it were composed at different times, and added on or inserted without sufficient regard to the rest. These things being given, though the reasoning is sometimes obscure or feeble, and the composition rather a patchwork, I see no sufficient grounds for holding that Xenophon did not write most of it as it stands. Not a few of the objections have arisen from imperfections of language, which criticism gradually diminishes in number. Some few I hope are removed in the suggestions above made. Many other objections, as far as I have examined them, appear to me hyper-critical or quite unfounded. There are plenty of real blots and blemishes in the book, which the critics have pointed out along with a number of more or less imaginary ones. When the text has been thoroughly purged of corruptions—and that has not been done yet—I should say that Xenophon ought to bear most of the blame for the faults which remain.

(3). How far does the characteristic Xenophontean vocabulary appear in *Mem.*? What light, if any, does the language throw on the date of composition? I will not give details. Indeed I have not collected them with quite sufficient care. But, *particles apart*, the vocabulary pure and simple is not very markedly Xn., though much of the almost unanalysable style is. *Particles apart* I do not know that the vocabulary is much more marked than that of the first part of the *Hellenics*. There are a few cases of such familiar Xn. words as *σύν*, *ἔστε*, *ἐπεί* temporal, *ὥς* final (I have only noticed one, 1. 4. 6), *πρόσθεν*, *ἐνθα*, *ἦ*, *μείων*, *τέκνα*, *ἔλεξεν*, *αὔξειν*, and some others, e.g. *ἄμμα*, *εὐπετῶς*, *μοχθεῖν*,

τερπνός, *εὐμενής*, *εὐφροσύνη*, *λυσitteλεῖν*, *ὥσαύτως*, *δωρεῖσθαι*, *ἀλλέεσθαι*, which belong to him; but the proportion is small. Particles, however, which are so conspicuously wanting in the first part of the *Hellenics*, are abundant here (as Roquette has shown) and quite Xn. in character. If therefore we are to give *Mem.* a decidedly later date, it must, I think, as far as the vocabulary goes, be on the strength of the particles. Again, there is not, as far as I see, any marked difference in vocabulary between different parts of the book, unless it be in the passage I am about to mention.

The well-known story in Book II. of the *Choice of Heracles* is of especial interest, and as there is a question whether and how far the language is that of Xenophon, or Prodicus, or (as I understand Gilbert, the Teubner editor, to say) some third person, I have thought it worth while to set down here the words in it that have a more or less Xn. character, referring the reader to previous articles for more information about them. The story occupies four pages in the Teubner text, and just as many in the new Oxford edition.

Mem. 2. 1. 21. *ἐπεί* of time. 22. *εὐπρεπής* good-looking, *ἄμμα* twice, *θαμά*. 23. *πρόσθεν*, *τερπνά*. 24. *τέρπομαι*, *εὐφραίνομαι*, *ἀπόνως* (X. is always keen on *φιλοπονία*). 27. *ἦπερ*. 28. *ἐθέλω* = *βούλομαι* (*Αναβ.* 4. 4. 6), *αὔξω*, *σύν*. 29. *εὐφροσύνη*. 30. *τλήμων*. 31. *ἀπόνως* again. 32. *εὐμενής*. 33. *ἄμοχος*, *γεραίτεροι*, *ἀγάλλομαι*, *πεπρωμένος* (*Hell.* 6. 3. 6.), *τοκεῖς*. To these we may add as in some degree of like nature (30) *καθυπνοῦν* (31), *ἀθέατος* (32), *συλλήπτρια* (32), *χωρίς ἐμοῦ* (32), *μακαριστός*, *Ἠσυχία* (21), a *solitary place*, *solitude*, is also noticeable.

The passage is highly elaborated, and that is why there are so many of these words occurring in it, quite out of proportion to the average number. We know of course nothing about the style of Prodicus, except that he was nice in his choice of words and careful, perhaps over careful, in discriminating synonyms. No doubt on such a theme he too may have used some of these words. Socrates is made to say of him (34), in words curiously like those of the *Theaetetus* 168 c about Protagoras, that he used *ἐν μεγαλειότη-ροισι ῥήμασιν ἢ ἐγὼ νῦν*. But the coincidence of all these Xn. expressions, taken along with many other Xn. touches in the passage, leaves no doubt in my mind that the writer was Xenophon, not Prodicus, nor another.

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